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Abstract
The principal recent studies of patent reform (NAS (2004), FTC
(2003), Jaffe and Lerner (2004)) contend that a uniform system of patent
protection must (or should) be available for "anything under the sun
made by man" based upon one or more of the following premises: (1)
the Patent Act requires this breadth and uniformity of treatment; (2)
"discriminating" against any particular field of "technology" would be
undesirable; (3) discrimination among technologies would present in-
surmountable boundary problems and could easily be circumvented
through clever patent drafting; and (4) interest group politics stand in the
way of excluding any subject matter classes from patent law or reform-
ing the patentability requirements, duration, defenses, or remedies for a
particular subject matter class. As a result, these studies consider and
recommend reforms that would apply to all fields of patentable subject
matter ("systemic reforms") and largely ignore reforms that would either
bar particular classes of "technology" from patent protection (e.g., soft-
ware, business method, genomic sequences) or afford different classes of
patentable subject matter different requirements or remedies ("categori-
cal reforms"). This Article sets forth a method for evaluating and
formulating patent policy that considers both systemic and categorical
reforms and sketches out how that method could be applied to the cur-
rent patent "crisis."
t This Article is fashioned as a patent application to illustrate the patent system's shift
away from subject matter limitations and highlight the need for a neutral, comprehensive
framework for patent system reform. To the extent that the style of this Article creates any
misimpression about its purpose, any ideas contained herein are dedicated to the public.
* Professor of Law and Director, Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, University
of California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall). I thank Brian Kahin for organizing the
conference on Patents and Diversity in Innovation held at the University of Michigan Law
School on September 29-30, 2006, Robert Barr for valuable and enjoyable conversations
about patent reform, Jonathan Band, Bob Hunt, Mark Lemley, and Lee Van Pelt for comments
on an earlier draft, and Tom Fletcher for research assistance. I bear full responsibility for the
views and shortcomings of this Article.
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Background
1. Technical Field
Prior to 1998, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to as-
sert that this Article fit within any field of patentable subject matter. But
under the Federal Circuit's expansive interpretation of patentable subject
matter-essentially collapsing the subject matter inquiry into the utility
requirement'---economists, lawyers, television production executives,
script writers, and just about anyone else can now characterize their
creativity as falling within a technical field.2 Under this expansive con-
ception, the claimed "invention" described and claimed herein fits
generally within the "technical" field of patent policy analysis. Ironi-
cally, the "invention"--if implemented properly-would likely block the
very type of protection sought herein. But as suggested in Claim 2, the
"invention" is most likely to be politically feasible only if applied pro-
spectively.
2. Background of the "Invention"
The proper contours of patent protection have long been complex
and controversial. The optimal threshold, duration, and scope of even a
one-shot invention (i.e., an invention which does not serve as a building
block for later inventions) requires balancing the incentives to invent
against the dead weight loss from monopoly exploitation. There is good
reason to believe that this balance will vary across technological fields.
When cumulative innovation is introduced into the equation, the optimal
level of protection becomes even more complex as the standards for
protection, duration, and scope must appropriately balance between pio-
neering inventors and those who build upon their inventions. The patent
system also discloses knowledge that can be valuable in promoting cu-
mulative innovation. The policy calculus is further complicated by the
range of other motivations for and means by which inventors and inves-
1. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 946 (1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1093 (1999).
2. See Floyd Norris, You Can't Use That Tax Idea. It's Patented, NYTIMES, Oct. 20,
2006, at C1 (reporting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has issued 49 patents on tax
avoidance strategies); Andrew F. Knight, A Patently Novel Plot: Fiction, Information, and
Patents in the 21st Century, 47 IDEA 203 (2006); GREGORY AHARONIAN & RICHARD STIM,
PATENTING ART & ENTERTAINMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING CREATIVE IDEAS
(2004).
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tors can derive a sufficient expected rate of return to stimulate their in-
ventive efforts. For example, public funding of research, lead time
advantages, the availability of other forms of legal protection for creativ-
ity (trade secrecy; copyright protection for computer software),
reputational benefits (protected through trademarks), ancillary means of
deriving revenue from investments in creativity and inventions (such as
bundled advertising), and technological protection measures (such as
digital rights management) can substitute for and complement patent
protection. The policy calculus also considers direct and indirect costs of
patent protection-administration of the patent system, the direct costs
of prosecuting patent applications, the indirect costs of pursuing patents
(e.g., distractions and paperwork burdens for inventors), the costs of
maintaining and enforcing patents, and the due diligence burden im-
posed upon inventors and investors to avoid patent infringement. Finally,
the patent system can facilitate and perpetuate anti-competitive business
practices (collusion and market exclusion).
Given the heterogeneity of inventive resources and opportunities, no
one-size-fits-all system of protection can achieve "first best" optimality.
A uniform patent system that applies to all fields of technology will un-
doubtedly be both under and over-inclusive. On the other hand,
administrative and political constraints caution against significant discre-
tion in the granting and tailoring of patent protection. Thus, the efficacy
of the patent system depends on the extent to which rules of general ap-
plicability can distinguish among varying circumstances. The
nonobviousness requirement, for example, calibrates the appropriate
benchmark for patentability within fields of invention based on the
"person having ordinary skill in the art" (PHOSITA).3 Yet, such a stan-
dard is limited in its ability to control for all of the factors relevant to the
optimal level of protection. Several important variables-such as the
duration of the protection, infringement standards, defenses, and reme-
dies-are largely fixed and constant across technological fields. 4
Furthermore, the patent system overlooks several critical variables, in-
cluding the cost of innovation; the extent to which other means of
3. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002).
4. The patent system provides for some technology-specific variation. See, e.g., 35
U.S.C. § 287(c) (1999) (barring enforcement of medical procedure patents against medical
practitioners or related health care entities); 35 U.S.C. § 273 (1999) (providing a limited prior
user right with regard to business method patents). Section 155 allows for the term of drug
patents to be extended to compensate for regulatory review by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion, although this provision can be seen as preserving a uniform duration of effective
protection, not optimizing protection based on the costs and difficulty of invention.
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recouping investment exist; or technology-specific economic effects
(e.g., network effects).'
Many prior art patent policy assessments proceed under the assump-
tion that patent law must be essentially "technology neutral": that it must
extend to all "technologies," that it must apply the same general stan-
dards to protectability, and that it must afford all technologies the same
rights and remedies. Nonetheless, until recently judicial interpretation of
both the constitutional authority under which Congress may enact patent
protection and the Patent Act itself constrained the subject matter of
patent protection along several dimensions.7 The Federal Circuit, how-
ever, has largely removed such constraints through narrow interpretation
of Supreme Court precedent and questionable interpretation of the Patent
Act of 1952.8
Several scholars have questioned the patentability of some classes of
technology on both jurisprudential and public policy grounds.9 Some of
5. See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 1329 (1987).
6. A notable exception is Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent
Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575 (2003), which proposes various technology-specific adjustments.
7. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) ("This Court has undoubtedly
recognized limits to § 101 and every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas."); Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)
("[pihenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual
concepts are ... the basic tools of scientific and technological work"); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v.
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) (fundamental scientific principles as "part of the
storehouse of knowledge" and manifestations of laws of nature as "free to all men and re-
served exclusively to none"); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939) ("a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression of it, is not patentable inven-
tion"); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How. 62, 14 L.Ed. 601 (1854); see also Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("Since no patent is available for a discovery, however
useful, novel, and nonobvious, unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable
subject matter of 35 U.S.C. § 101, the holder of such a discovery would have no reason to
apply for a patent whether trade secret protection existed or not. Abolition of trade secret pro-
tection would, therefore, not result in increased disclosure to the public of discoveries in the
area of nonpatentable subject matter. Also, it is hard to see how the public would be benefited
by disclosure of customer lists or advertising campaigns; in fact, keeping such items secret
encourages businesses to initiate new and individualized plans of operation, and constructive
competition results. This, in turn, leads to a greater variety of business methods than would
otherwise be the case if privately developed marketing and other data were passed illicitly
among firms involved in the same enterprise.").
8. See AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
9. See Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A
Novel and Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV.
303 (2002); Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990);
Peter S. Menell, Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329
(1987).
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these studies have proposed alternative regimes for protecting these
works. To the extent that others have suggested excluding some classes
of "technology" from the patent system, these analyses have not fully
compared the advantages and disadvantages of the full range of policy
alternatives. This invention asserts that the answer to the question
"should we pursue systemic or categorical patent reform?" is not one or
the other but both and offers a comprehensive framework for structuring
this inquiry.
3. Summary of the "Invention"
The method described herein provides a comprehensive framework
for formulating and evaluating patent policy. It recognizes that systemic
reform proposals are limited in their ability to address the full range of
variability affecting the optimal encouragement of technological innova-
tion through patent protection, and that categorical reform proposals
overlook interactive effects with systems reforms. Therefore, it recom-
mends a parallel track process for considering both sets of reforms as
well as integrated policy reforms. Finally, it assesses the administrative
and political feasibility of pursuing such reforms.
Description
1. The Economics of Intellectual Property Protection for
Functional Works'0
The principal justification for intellectual property derives from a
broader economic problem: the inability of a competitive market to sup-
port an efficient level of innovation in some areas of technology,
particularly those areas in which research and development (R&D) is
costly, innovation is easily perceived, and imitation is relatively inexpen-
sive and can occur rapidly. In a competitive economy, profits will be
driven to zero, not accounting for sunk costs such as R&D. Although
imitation keeps prices low for consumers and avoids the deadweight loss
of monopolistic pricing, it produces a sub-optimal level of investment in
R&D. Most firms would not invest in developing new technologies if
rivals could enter the market and dissipate the profits before R&D costs,
10. This section draws upon Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Prop-
erly Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., forthcoming 2007); Peter S. Menell, Intellectual Property: General Theories, in 2 EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit de Geest eds., 2000).
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adjusted for attendant risks, could be recovered. Economists refer to this
phenomenon as an appropriability problem. Prospective inventors will
underinvest in R&D if they are unable to derive an adequate rate of re-
turn on their investment.
Unlike tangible goods, knowledge and creative works are public
goods in the sense that their use is nonrivairous. One agent's use does
not limit another agent's use. Indeed, in its natural state, knowledge is
also "nonexcludable." That is, even if someone claims to own the
knowledge, it is difficult to exclude others from using it. Intellectual
property law is an attempt to solve that appropriability problem by legal
means; it grants exclusive use of the protected knowledge or creative
work to the inventor or creator. For other forms of property, exclusion is
often accomplished by physical means, such as building a fence. (In
some contexts, inventors can prevent or hinder access to technology
through encryption or other means of limiting access to knowledge. Such
approaches can work for some process inventions, but are not available
with regard to products that can be understood by inspection or disas-
sembly.) Intellectual property is a legal device by which the inventor can
control entry and exclude users from intangible assets.
Such control, however, reduces social welfare in several ways. First,
monopoly pricing results in deadweight loss to consumers. Two other
defects are that it may inhibit the use of scientific or technological
knowledge for further research, and, from an ex ante point of view, there
is no guarantee that the research effort will be delegated efficiently to
either the most efficient firms or to the right number of firms. Commen-
tators have lamented the defects of intellectual property since the
nineteenth century, in more or less the same terms as today."
Patent protection seeks to balance these competing effects by af-
fording protection only to substantial (non-obvious) inventions, limiting
the term of protection, and requiring that the inventor fully disclose the
invention. In the most basic model of patent protection-where inven-
tions do not serve as building blocks for later inventions and the only
control variable is the duration of protection-Nordhaus showed that the
optimal duration of patent protection balanced the incentives for innova-
tion against the deadweight loss of monopoly exploitation.
Cumulative innovation-where first generation inventions become
inputs for second generation innovators-substantially complicates the
design of patent protection. In order to reward first generation innovators
11. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth
Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950).
12. See generally WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE; A
THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (1969).
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sufficiently for inventions that may produce positive spillovers by ena-
bling second generation inventions (improvements, new applications,
and accessories), first generation innovators should be able to appropri-
ate some of the value of second generation innovations.'3 On the other
hand, providing even a share of the second generation innovators' returns
to the first generation innovator reduces the incentive for second genera-
tion innovators to pursue their research. This tension is abated to the
extent that first generation innovators are best positioned to pursue sec-
ond generation innovation or where collaboration (e.g., joint ventures)
brings the first and second generation innovations within the same profit
center. 4 The cumulative nature of innovation unquestionably strengthens
the case for allowing joint ventures, especially with respect to comple-
mentary products.'5 In practice, however, it is rare that one entity is best
positioned to pursue all second generation projects. Furthermore, second
generation innovators are not known (and cannot be knowable) before
first generation research investments must be made. Yet, once first gen-
eration research investments are made, they are sunk costs which
become irrelevant for bargaining over the division of profits from
multi-generation innovation. This problem can be addressed by expand-
ing the duration and scope of first generation patents or by denying
patent protection altogether to second generation innovation.' 6 These re-
sults, however, depend critically upon strong assumptions relating to
licensing of innovation and the knowledge and rationality of innovators.
As the institutional literature notes, there are many strategic impedi-
ments to licensing of innovation." In addition, much of the institutional
literature casts doubt on the degree to which innovators possess good
information for assessing the best diffusion path for their technologies
and whether innovators behave rationally in licensing to actual and po-
tential competitors.' 8
Figure 1 illustrates the range of factors affecting the optimal design
for patent protection and indicates the conditions favoring strong
13. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research
and the Patent Law, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 29 (1991).
14. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265 (1977).
15. See Suzanne Scotchmer, Patents as an Incentive System, 2 EcON. IN A CHANGING
WORLD 281 (Beth Allen ed., 1996); See also Michael L. Katz & Janusz A. Ordover, R&D
Cooperation and Competition, 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcTIVITY: MICROECO-
NOMICS 137.
16. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit in Sequential
Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20 (1995).
17. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839 (1990).
18. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law,
75 TEx. L. REV. 989 (1997).
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protection on the one hand, and weak or no protection on the other. The
most important considerations in assessing the need for patent protection
are the cost of research and development (especially in relation to imita-
tion costs), the technological risk associated with such research, and the
availability of effective non-patent means of protection. The pharmaceu-
tical industry has long been recognized as depending critically upon
patent protection due to the high costs of research, the great uncertainty
in the discovery process, and the ease of imitation of the final product.
Trade secret protection can afford some protection for process inven-
tions, but relatively less for products. By contrast, the costs of much
software innovation today is relatively low. Powerful computers can be
obtained for a modest investment and the versatility of computing ma-
chines and programming languages provide a relatively high likelihood
of success for many software development projects. Furthermore, the
availability of alternative means of protecting innovation-including
direct public funding of innovation, other means of legal protection
(copyright, trade secrecy, trademark), technical means of protection (for
example, metered access through the use of encryption), and mar-
ket-based protections (lead-time/first mover advantage, ancillary means
of appropriating a return to an invention (such as bundling access to a
product or service with advertising), general reputational benefits)-can
substitute for and in some cases obviate the need for patent protection.
Software, for example, can be protected against piracy by copyright and
against functional imitation by trade secrecy, technological protection
measures, and contractual restraints. On the other hand, patent protection
may counteract the adverse effects of trade secrecy protection by pro-
moting disclosure of knowledge.' 9 But in the case of software, this
benefit has largely been compromised by court decisions allowing soft-
ware to be claimed in highly abstract ways without the need to disclose
source code.20
19. See David D. Friedman, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Some Econom-
ics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. EcON. PERSP. 61 (1991).
20. Fonar Corp. v. General Electric Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Figure 1
Economic Criteria for Assessing Patent Protection
Strongest Conditions for Conditions Disfavoring
Patent Protection Patent Protection
High R&D Low
High Technological Risk Low
Low Public Funding High
Ineffective Availability of Alternate Effective
Appropriability Mechanisms
Substantial ImportanceNalue of Patent Insubstantial
Disclosure
Broader scope if not highly Cumulativeness of Narrower scope if highly
cumulative and/or low Innovation/Effectiveness of cumulative and high
licensing costs Licensing Institutions licensing costs
None or effective standard Network Effects Substantial and costly
setting standard
Clear boundaries Clarity of Rights/Due Fuzzy boundaries
Diligence Costs
Low Leveraging/Misuse Potential High
Low Other Abuse Problems High
From an economic standpoint, therefore, the case for patent protec-
tion for particular types of inventions will vary. Due to the heterogeneity
of inventive activity, the relatively uniform features of patent protection
inevitably leads to under- and over-protection for particular technologies.
Patent protection initially arose in the age of mechanical inventions. The
system adapted reasonably well to later technological waves, from
chemical to electrical to pharmaceutical innovation. But even in these
fields, the need for, and efficacy of, the patent protection varied.2 ' Each
of these areas tended to fit the prototypical scenario for which patent law
was designed: the need to ensure that investors and inventors could ap-
propriate an adequate return for their investments in R&D. The advent of
computer software and genomic research introduced several distinctive
ingredients into the patent policy equation, including substantial gov-
ernment funding of research, highly cumulative characteristics, network
effects (in the case of software), and a wide range of ancillary means of
protecting innovation (software).
21. See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D, 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (1987).
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2. Fallacies of the "One-Size-Fits-All Patent" Reform Paradigm
Notwithstanding the heterogeneity of inventive activity and the
technology-specific variability among the factors affecting the efficacy
of the patent system, the leading patent reform studies adopt a
"one-size-fits-all" paradigm and largely disregard subject matter exclu-
sions or technology-specific rules.
Perhaps the most surprising study to dismiss categorical reforms is
Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is En-
dangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It, a
monograph by Professors Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, two leading em-
pirical economists who have studied several aspects of the patent
system." Their book attributes the crisis in U.S. patent law to two largely
administrative developments over the past two and a half decades: (1)
the creation of a specialized patent appellate court (the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit), which has significantly and unjustifiably broad-
ened patent holder's rights; and (2) a shift in funding at the Patent Office
in the early 1990s that has severely undercut the quality of patent ex-
amination. As remedies, they recommend expanded opportunities for
interested third parties to participate in the patent examination and re-
view process (most notably, the development of an effective opposition
system along the lines of that used in Europe) and better funding of the
Patent Office.
Given their comprehensive discussion of the economics of patent
policy,23 it is remarkable that they so readily reject categorical reform
choices. Their position is based less on a careful analysis of the costs and
benefits of such policy options and more on a variety of cursory objec-
tions. Although they include the expansion of patentable subject matter
24among the causes for the overbroadening of patent protection, they
seem resigned to the view that patent law must extend to "anything un-
der the sun that is made by man." They confront this issue more directly
22. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: How OUR
BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do
ABOUT IT (2004).
23. Id. at 25-77.
24. Id. at 115-19.
25. Diamond v. Diehr, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1981). Jaffe and Lemer note that the phrase
originated in the legislative report accompanying the 1952 Patent Act. See Jaffe & Lerner,
supra note 22, at 216 n. 92. They fail to appreciate, however, that this quotation was used out
of context and a full reading of the legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to
expand patentable subject matter through the 1952 Act beyond recognizing use patents. Con-
gress fully intended to retain the doctrines limiting patentable subject matter. See generally
Peter S. Menell, Are Software Patents ". . . anything under the sun made by man ... "?
(manuscript in progress 2007, on file with author); Brief for Computer & Communications
Industry Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4-10, Laboratory Corp. of
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in their recommendations chapter. Although recognizing that "the major
problems" in the patent system are perceived to be in the areas of "soft-
ware, business methods, and certain aspects of biotechnology such as
genetic sequences," they assert without further explanation that these
problems are merely transitional26 and "manifestations of the broader
problems of the system as a whole.,2 7 They worry that technol-
ogy-specific reforms would open up the patent system to a Pandora's
box of special pleading.
In rejecting exclusion of business methods, Jaffe and Lerner resort to
an ad hominem argument, suggesting that opposition to business method
patents is a form of "techno-snobbery. 2 9 They then argue by analogy to
other areas of patentable subject matter (that might or might not merit
patent protection):
As a general proposition, important new business methods are
not dissimilar from other forms of innovation: they often require
major investments of time and money in development; there are
methods other than patents (e.g., secrecy) that can sometimes be
used to protect these investments, but there are also cases where,
in the absence of patent protection, the risk of imitation would
seriously undermine development incentives.30
Yet Jaffe and Lerner provide no concrete evidence to suggest that ap-
propriability is now lacking in the development of business method
patents (which were outside of patent protection for the first two centuries
of U.S. patent law and remain so in Europe and Japan) or that the benefits
of patent protection outweigh the anticompetitive harms and other mis-
chief caused by allowing such patents . Instead, they presume that all
"inventions" should be entitled to patent protection and assert that the
success of their proposed patent system reforms in weeding out bad pat-
ents means that categorical adjustments need not be considered at all.
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., No. 04-607 (U.S. June 22, 2006), 2006
U.S. LEXIS 4893. In any case, economic analysis should be guided not by legal interpretation
but by social welfare. Congress can certainly revise the contours of patentable subject matter.
26. Jaffe & Lemer, supra note 22, at 145-48.
27. Id. at 198.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 199.
30. Id. at 200.
31. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TCH. L. J. 263 (2000); See also Michael J. Meurer, Busi-
ness Methods and Patent Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 309 (2002); See also Michael J.
Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44
B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003); cf John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40
B.C. L. REV. 1139 (1999).
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Along similar lines, Jaffe and Lerner discount assertions that the
cumulative nature of software innovation might justify categorical treat-
ment because most fields of technology advance cumulatively." This
response, however, oversimplifies the economic significance of
field-specific differences. They note earlier in their book that the nature
and effectiveness of cross-licensing plays a critical role in assessing the
efficacy of the patent system," yet they make no effort to apply this in-
sight in considering reforms. Furthermore, by addressing but a few of the
factors in the patent protection matrix (Figure 1), Jaffe and Lerner mar-
ginalize categorical reform options. But the magnitude of the U.S. patent
system's failings in particular technological fields, the "rational igno-
rance" of the Patent Office, 4 and the costs of achieving an optimal
balance of false positives (patents that should not issue) and false nega-
tives (improper rejections)35 could justify patentable subject matter
exclusions. Furthermore, the particular characteristics of business meth-
ods, software, or genomic code may justify promulgation of rules
specific to these fields of "invention."
The National Academies of Science 2004 report, A Patent System for
the 21st Century,36 also gives short shrift to categorical patent law re-
forms. While drawing on a collection of industry-specific studies
detailing substantial inter-industry differences bearing on optimal patent
protection, the National Academy of Sciences ("NAS") Report
side-steps consideration of categorical reforms by adopting as its first
evaluation criterion the principle that "the patent system should accom-
modate new technologies., 38 It interprets this criterion to mean that the
patent system should be "unitary" (one-size-fits-all) with few a priori
exclusions.39 Like the Jaffe and Lerner analysis, the NAS Report bases
32. Jaffe & Lemer, supra note 22, at 201-02.
33. Id. at 59-64.
34. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV.
1495 (2001).
35. Shuba Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of Optimal Ig-
norance in the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REV. 1219 (2004).
36. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACADS. OF Sci., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE
21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004) [herein-
after "NAS Report"].
37. See, e.g., PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M. Cohen &
Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (one such industry specific study); cf NAS Report, supra note
36, at 36.
38. NAS Report, supra note 36, at 41.
39. Id. at 41-44. The report observed that some doubts about the propriety of software
and business method patents existed but considered the matter insufficiently clear to reach any
firm conclusions or recommendations. Id. at 44 n. 11. Given the composition of the Commit-
tee on Intellectual Property Rights in the Knowledge-Based Economy, which included several
corporate and patent professionals, it is not surprising that the group declined to question the
dogma that patents should be available for "anything under the sun made by man." Even if this
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this criterion not on systematic research about the optimal promotion of
the useful arts but rather on the dubious premises that Congress intended
patent law to apply to "anything under the sun made by man" and that
such broad availability of a uniform system of patent protection is justi-
fied by economic analysis. The report suggests that the problems
associated with new subject matter fields, such as business methods, are
only transitional.4° While this may be partially true for assessing novelty
and non-obviousness, the NAS Report overlooks the broader question of
whether patent protection is needed at all or whether the default regime
of patent law, with its 20 year duration, limited defenses, and strong
remedies, is appropriate. Given its "unitary system" criterion, the NAS
Report recommends systemic as opposed to categorical reforms.
The Federal Trade Commission's 2003 report, To Promote Innova-
tion: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy,
41
comes the closest to considering categorical reforms. Chapter 3 of this
study examines the effect of the current patent system on innovation in
several important and rapidly evolving industries: pharmaceuticals, bio-
technology, semiconductors, and software/Internet. The section of the
report discussing the software and Internet industries concluded:
The software and Internet industries generally are characterized
by five factors: (1) innovation occurs on a cumulative basis; (2)
capital costs are low, particularly relative to the pharmaceutical,
biotechnology and hardware industries; (3) the rate of techno-
logical change is rapid, and product life cycles are short; (4)
alternative means of fostering innovation exist, including copy-
right protection and open source software; and (5) the industries
have experienced a regime change in terms of availability of
patent protection.
Panelists consistently stated that competition drives innovation
in these industries. Innovation is also fostered by some industry
participants' use of copyright protection or open source soft-
ware. Several panelists discounted the value of patent
disclosures, because the disclosure of a software product's un-
derlying source code is not required.
phrase were not taken out of context, however, the NAS was certainly at liberty to propose to
Congress that patentable subject matter be circumscribed and/or tailored to reflect technol-
ogy-specific differences.
40. Id. at 90.
41. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COM-
PETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003) [hereinafter "FTC Report"].
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Many panelists and participants expressed the view that software
and Internet patents are impeding innovation. They stated that
such patents are impairing follow-on incentives, increasing entry
barriers, creating uncertainty that harms incentives to invest in
innovation, and producing patent thickets. Panelists discussed
how defensive patenting increases the complexity of patent
thickets and forces companies to divert resources from R&D
into obtaining patents. Commentators noted that patent thickets
make it more difficult to commercialize new products and raise
uncertainty and investment risks. Some panelists also noted that
hold-up has become a problem that can result in higher prices
42being passed along to consumers.
Despite these observations, the report limits its specific recommen-
dations to system-wide recommendations: instituting an improved
post-grant opposition system; changing the burden of proof in adjudi-
cating patent validity; tightening the non-obviousness standard;
increasing funding of the Patent Office; improving examination proce-
dures; requiring publication of all patent applications after 18 months;
creating a prior user right with regard to claims introduced in continuing
applications; and increasing the threshold to establish willful infringe-
ment.43 The FTC declined to recommend that Congress curtail patentable
subject matter or make any categorical adjustments to patent standards,
stating only that courts should "consider possible harm to competi-
tion-along with other possible benefits and costs-before extending the
scope of patentable subject matter.'"
Like the Jaffe and Lerner study and the NAS Report, the FTC Report
falls back on convention and political expedience rather than economic
analysis in declining to confront categorical reforms. The FTC Report
does not consider abolition or restriction of patent protection for com-
puter software. With regard to business methods, the Report observes
that:
defenders of business method patents stressed that universality
of patentable subject matter has been a significant factor in U.S.
technological development. They argued that in the absence of
clear empirical evidence, the default position should be that an
invention is patentable. Stated alternatively, they suggested that
42. Id. ch. 3, at 55-56.
43. Id. Executive Summary, at 7-17.
44. Id. at 14.
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the promotion of innovation should be presumed unless empiri-
cal evidence to the contrary exists. 5
The Report then cited presenters who testified that "business methods
traditionally evolve in response to competition and internal business needs,
without regard to legal rights to exclusivity" and may impair follow-on
innovation. ' 6 Nonetheless, it declined to make any recommendation for
judicial or legislative action to restrict patentability of business methods
because of the complexity of the issues and the diversity of views ex-
pressed. 7
These studies indicate that policy analysts have been unable to de-
velop and apply a comprehensive method for analyzing the full range of
patent reform options. Constraining patent reform to "one-size-fits-all"
options potentially overlooks policies that could enhance innovation and
competition.4'8 A comprehensive method for evaluating patent reforms
promises great social benefit by reducing the tremendous social
costs-in terms of process and anti-competitive effects-of the present
patent system.
3. A Comprehensive Framework for Reforming the Patent
System
The present invention integrates both systemic and categorical patent
reforms within a cohesive evaluative framework. Systemic patent re-
forms are defined as reforms that would apply to all fields of patentable
subject matter. Categorical reforms are defined as reforms that would
either exclude particular classes of "technology" from patent protection
or afford different classes of patentable subject matter different require-
ments or remedies. Use of the comprehensive framework increases the
likelihood of achieving optimal incentives for innovation.
Figure 2 presents a flow chart illustrating the invention. The first
step is to diagnose the problems of the current patent system. The second
step branches into two parallel evaluative processes: (a) identifying and
evaluating systemic reform options (such as implementing a post-grant
opposition system or changing the presumption of validity); and (b)
identifying and evaluating categorical reform options (such as excluding
business method patents or altering the duration of software patents).
Each evaluative process assesses the expected costs and benefits of these
45. Id. ch. 4, at 43.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 845 (2006).
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reforms and determines the expected net benefits. Step 3 evaluates
combined reform options-drawn from the union of both systemic and
categorical reform possibilities-and determines the net expected value
of such mixed reform strategies. It is possible to go through Steps 2a and
2b and find in Step 3 that some reforms identified in Step 2a are not
worth pursuing in light of categorical reforms identified in Step 2b. In
other words, the combination of these reforms is not simply additive but
may be integrative. Suppose, for example, that the Step 2a analysis
points in the direction of a much higher standard of nonobviousness as a
second best way of mitigating problems associated with a software pat-
ent thicket. But if Step 2b leads to a recommendation that software
patents be eliminated or curtailed, then raising the nonobviousness stan-
dard (across the board) would not necessarily be warranted. Step 4
selects the reform or reforms yielding the highest net expected benefits.
As part of this process, the policy analyst would need to grapple
with several complicating issues, such as whether problems in setting
and policing boundaries associated with categorical rules would make
such policies unworkable. The method could incorporate both the ex-
perience of other nations and the experience from earlier periods of the
U.S. patent system. For example, the United States barred patents on
business methods for much of the 20th century and Europe continues to
do so. The United States also barred or substantially limited software
patents for many years. It should be noted that boundaries need not be
perfect in order for categorical reforms to be worthy of consideration.
Many areas of the law face definitional issues. The Supreme Court has
previously indicated in the context of software patents that "[t]he con-
cept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is not 'like a nose of wax
which may be turned and twisted in any direction .... "49 The policy
analysis might also examine the ability of the system to change over
time. Policy reforms might include institutional mechanisms by which
patent policy can be reviewed periodically.
One skilled in the art of patent policy analysis would appreciate the
great benefit of providing objective and unbiased analysis aimed at pur-
suing the true goal of the patent system-"to promote progress in the...
useful arts"-and not putting political expediency and the private inter-
ests of particular players above the broader social interest. The invention
also avoids the use of biased burdens of proof, such as a presumption
that patent protection should be available for all innovations, regardless
49. Parker v. Rook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978) (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47,
51 (1886)). It would be possible to exclude software reasonably effectively by barring patents
on any process or apparatus in which the point of novelty resides in a software element. See
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 200-02, 219 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of field, unless it can be shown empirically that such protection would be
harmful. The costs of the patent system are not always easily measured,
and those possessing the best information may enjoy private benefits
(such as exclusion of competition) that make them unwilling to reveal
such information. °
Figure 2




Step 2a: Step 2b:
Identify and Evaluate Identify and Evaluate
Systemic Reforms Categorical Reforms
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Select Reform or Re-
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Expected Net Benefits
50. See Arnold Plant,
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 30 (1934).
The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1
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Although it might seem that the present invention would be obvious
to one skilled in the art of patent policy analysis, there is good reason to
believe that it passes muster under the Federal Circuit's standards for
judging non-obviousness.' Notwithstanding the fact that each element of
the claimed invention is contained in the prior art, the combination of
elements has not been published. Similarly, since this is a new patent
field, examiners have relatively little training in this area, there is little or
no patent prior art, and time and database constraints severely limit the
ability of examiners to search non-patent prior art." Furthermore, the
"leading" studies all teach away from the claimed invention.
53
The Jaffe and Lerner, NAS, and FTC policy analyses are preoccu-
pied with implicit judgments regarding what reforms will not be blocked
by interest groups. This concern prevents them from seriously consider-
ing a range of categorical patent reforms that could well better "promote
progress of the useful arts" than systemic reforms. They fail to recognize
the inherent imprecision and costliness of quality control. They also re-
flect undue optimism that the nonobviousness standard can solve the
manifest problems. The nonobviousness problem is inherently difficult
and leaves open the possibility of undeserved patents hindering competi-
tion. Furthermore, the studies fail to recognize the adverse long-term
effects of the creation of patent portfolios in the information technology
51. See In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring docu-
mentation of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine references); In re Dembiczak,
175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (observing that "the best defense against the subtle but
powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is rigorous application of the
requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references");
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing "teaching or
suggestion or motivation [to combine]" as an "essential evidentiary component of an obvi-
ousness holding"); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ("the Board must
identify specifically ... the reasons one of ordinary skill in the art would have been motivated
to select the references and combine them"); In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1265 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (examiner can satisfy burden of obviousness in light of combination "only by showing
some objective teaching [leading to the combination]"); In re Fine, 837 F2d 1071, 1075 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (evidence of teaching or suggestion "essential" to avoid hindsight).
52. See FTC Report, supra note 41, Chapter 5, at 4-5 (estimating the average time that
an a patent examiner devotes to all aspects of patent examination--including prior art search-
ing, correspondence, analysis, revision, and drafting written responses and disposition--at
between 12 and 25 hours per application); See also Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impos-
sible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System
Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495 (2001).
53. See Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 110 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (concluding that an invention was not obvious in part on the basis of a finding that a
reference "did not disclose the use of valves to bypass the dialyzer, but actually taught away
from that solution"); In re Braat, No. 90-1197, 1990 WL 143491, at *2 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re
Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988); W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock,
Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1551-53 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Lance L. Barry, Teaching A Way IS NOT
Teaching Away, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 867 (1997).
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industries. At the same time, they demand both perfection and irrefutable
empirical proof for categorical reform. In so doing, they fail to recognize
or evaluate the key policy tradeoffs of patent policy: (1) whether patent
protection is needed or justified (based a on cost-benefit analysis) in par-
ticular fields; and (2) the extent to which boundary problems are so
substantial that categorical reform is wholly infeasible. On the latter
question, prior U.S. patent law experience," the previous rule against
business method patents, and the evidence from Europe in limiting both
software and business method patents suggest that categorical reforms in
these areas are feasible. With regard to biotechnology, it would not be
difficult to bar composition claims on human genetic code. Whether or
not such a policy is worthwhile remains to be seen. But it should not be
ignored.
Prospective implementation of categorical reforms neutralizes or
reduces the political economy concern. To the extent that those interests
that hold patents would stand in the way of salutary categorical patent
reforms on the ground that they would lose valuable rights, categorical
reforms could be implemented on a prospective basis. In this way, patent
owners would obtain a short run benefit of having secured some exclu-
sive rights in markets in which no new patents would be available (or, in
the case of tailored categorical reforms, where the value of new patents
would be less). Even so, firms in the industry would immediately, upon
passage of such legislation, move toward more competitive business
strategies and stop their costly patent acquisition efforts. Such an ap-
proach could also diffuse the prisoner's dilemma that may be occurring
in some marketplaces whereby all or many of the participants would
prefer that patents did not inhibit business decision making, but are
forced to pursue patent protection in order to avoid being vulnerable to
the patents of competitors and be in a position to cross-license. 5
4. Preferred Embodiments
The claimed invention has direct application to the current U.S. pat-
ent reform debate. There is good reason to believe that the present patent
"crisis" can be traced to a substantial and growing use of patents in the
54. See generally Parker, 437 U.S. 584 (barring patents for inventions in which the
point of novelty is software-based).
55. Some have suggested that this pattern characterizes the semiconductor industry. See
Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, in PATENTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, supra note 37, at 180; Bronwyn H. Hall & Rosemarie H.
Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox: Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Indus-
try: 1979-1995, 32 RAND J. ECON. 101 (2001); FTC Report, supra note 41, ch. 3, at 23-29,
51-55.
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software industry 6 as well as the emergence of business method patent-
ing. Since 1980, the number of software patents issued each year in the
United States has grown from about 1% of total patents to approximately
15% (24,891 of 167,438) by 2002.57 Between 1984 and 2000, software
patents grew from 3% of litigated patents to 22%."s Business method
patents are still a relatively small percentage of overall patents, but their
potential breadth has caused substantial problems for emerging busi-
nesses.
The boundaries of software and business method patents are inher-
ently ambiguous. 5 Whether or not software patent quality is any worse
than in other fields,60 there are numerous false positives (patents that
should not have issued) that are disrupting businesses and, more impor-
tantly, there is relatively little evidence that software patents promote
software innovation. 61 The growing evidence is that most software pat-
enting is driven by strategic considerations (such as building patent
portfolios for defensive purposes) and not as support for innovation.62
Even software companies that had long opposed software patenting are
being compelled to build their own patent arsenal.63 Much of the costly
56. See James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents
(2004) http://www.researchoninnovation.org/swpat.pdf [hereinafter "Empirical Look at Soft-
ware Patents"]; Bronwyn H. Hall & Megan MacGarvie, The Private Value of Software Patents
(Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (finding on the basis of stock market data that there is
no evidence that software patents have benefited software firms); Bronwyn H. Hall, Exploring
the Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005); Bronwyn H. Hall, Business Method
Patents, Innovation, and Policy, (NBER Working Paper No. W 8717, 2003); Robert M. Hunt,
You Can Patent That? Are Patents on Computer Programs and Business Methods Good for the
New Economy?, PHILADELPHIA FED. RES. BANK Bus. REV., Q1 2001, at 5, available at
http://www.phil.frb.org/files/br/brq lOlbh.pdf.
57. See Empirical Look at Software Patents, supra note 56, at 47.
58. See James Bessen & Michael Meurer, Do Patents Work? ch. 7 at 8 (2006) (manu-
script).
59. Id.
60. See John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987 (2003).
61. See Ronald J. Mann & Thomas W. Sager, Patents, Venture Capital, and Software
Startups, RES. POL'Y (forthcoming 2007) (reporting that only one in four venture-backed
software firms acquired patents, but finding that patent acquisition in these firms is positively
correlated with several measures of progress); James Bessen, A Comment on "Do Patents
Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?" (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No.
06-13, May 2005), available at http://www.researchoninnovation.org/comment%20on%20
Mann.pdf.
62. See James Bessen, Patent Thickets: Strategic Patenting of Complex Technologies
(Working Paper, 2003), http://www.researchoninnovation.org/thicket.pdf; Gideon Parcho-
movsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 46-49 (2005) (describing
IBM's efforts to build a vast patent portfolio); An Empirical Look at Software Patents, supra
note 56.
63. After many years of opposing software patenting, Oracle Corporation has relented
and assembled its own arsenal of over 900 patents. See Official Policy Statement,
Oracle Corporation, Patent Policy (Jan. 26-27, 1994) http://lpf.ai.mit.edu/Patents/testimony/
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litigation in the software industry to date has involved smaller players,
including non-manufacturing entities, suing established firms.' The re-
cent lawsuit filed by IBM against Amazon.com indicates that the levee
holding back even more costly litigation may be breaking,65 just as Texas
Instruments' foray into the patent litigation arena two decades ago led to
the massive buildup of semiconductor patent portfolios.6
The costs associated with software and business method patents
arise outside of formal litigation as well. Holders of such patents often
threaten companies with litigation, resulting in large expenditures for
opinion letters to determine exposure (if any) and to reduce the risk of
willful infringement if litigation ensues. Opinion letters can cost in ex-
cess of $40,000 per patent asserted. Start-up companies are easy targets
for holders of weak patents of ambiguous scope because of the fragility
of their funding and the time-sensitivity of their business plan. The op-
portunity to cash in on questionable patents has attracted a new breed of
company that acquires patents in bankruptcy sales and on the open mar-
ket for the sole purpose of asserting them against lucrative targets. One
such entity, for example, acquired a patent for $50,000 that it subse-
quently asserted against Intel Corporation, seeking $8 billion in damages
61and a permanent injunction.
Thus, in addition to the systemic reforms currently under considera-
tion, the claimed method could be used to explore the full range of
categorical reforms. Although ongoing legislative review of patent policy
statements/oracle.statement.html (statement presented at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Of-
fice's Software Patent Hearings, San Jose, California).
64. See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 2003 WL 23100881 (E.D. Va.
2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir 2005), cert. denied
126 S.Ct. 174 (2006); Mercexchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F.Supp.2d 695 (E.D. Va.
2003), rev'd in part and aff d in part 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded,
126 S.Ct. 1837 (2006).
65. See Steve Lohr, I.B.M. Sues Amazon.com over Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006,
at Cl; See also Anne Broache & Dawn Kawamoto, Amazon Pays $40 Million to Settle
Patent Dispute, CNET NEWS.COM (Aug. 11, 2005), http://news.com.com/Amazon+pays+40+
million+to+settle+patent+dispute/2100-1030_3-5829193.html (settling lawsuits relating to
e-commerce patents); Gary L. Reback, Patently Absurd, FORBES, June 24, 2002, at 44 (re-
counting how IBM was able to extract upwards of $20 million from Sun Microsystems for
seven patents of questionable validity);
66. See Jaffe and Lerner, supra note 22, at 57-59; Ziedonis, Patent Litigation in the
U.S. Semiconductor Industry, supra note 55.
67. See Mathew Ingram, Guarding Ideas or Just Patent Blackmail?, GLOBE & MAIL
(Canada), June 2, 2005, at B14 (noting that the term "patent troll" was coined to describe
TechSearch's suit against Intel after the term "patent extortionist" gave rise to a libel suit);
Andrew Zajac, Intel Defamed Patent Rival, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 22, 1999, at Business-I
(describing the libel suit). See also Brenda Sandburg, A Modest Proposal: After Six Years of
the Status Quo, Software Companies Urge Congress to Revamp the Patent System, THE RE-
CORDER, May 5, 2005, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 115370308794 (describing the
TechSearch suit within the context of the current legislative reform efforts).
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as technological fields develop would be institutionally challenging,
there is good reason to believe that there is sufficient experience with
software patents and business method patents today to make a reasona-
bly sound judgment as to the desirability of a moratorium or tailoring of
protection for some fields of technology.
While the present invention has been described in terms of various
embodiments, it is not intended that the invention be limited to these
embodiments. Modification within the spirit of the invention will be ap-
parent to those skilled in the art. For example, policy analysts could
improve patent law with respect to business methods, biotechnology, or
nanotechnology applying the method taught herein.
Claims
What is claimed is:
1. A method for reforming the patent system comprising:
diagnosing problems of the existing patent system in promot-
ing progress in the useful arts;
identifying and evaluating the net benefits of non-technology
field-specific reforms (systemic reforms);
identifying and evaluating the net benefits of technology
field-specific reforms (categorical reforms);
evaluating the net benefits of combined systemic and cate-
gorical reforms;
selecting the patent system reform or reforms offering the
highest expected net benefits.
2. The method described in Claim 1, wherein the categorical re-
forms are implemented through legislation that applies only
prospectively.
50. The method described in Claim 1, wherein...
